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Abstract
A group of agents are waiting for their job to be processed in
a facility. We assume that each agent needs the same amount of
processing time and incurs waiting costs. The facility has two parallel
servers, being able to serve two agents at a time. We are interested
in finding the order to serve agents and the (positive or negative)
monetary compensations they should receive. We introduce two rules
for the problem, the minimal transfer rule and the maximal transfer
rule. We show that these two rules correspond to the Shapley (1953)
value of the queueing games with two servers, as discussed similarly
by Maniquet (2003) and Chun (2006a) for queueing problems with one
serve, when the worth of each coalition is appropriately defined. If the
worth of a coalition is defined by assuming the coalitional members are
served before the non-coalitional members, then the minimal transfer
rule is obtained. On the other hand, if it is defined by assuming
the coalitional members are served after the non-coalitional members,
then the maximal transfer rule is obtained.
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1. Introduction
The queueing problem is concerned with the following situation. A group of
agents are waiting for their job to be processed in a facility. The facility can
handle one agent at a time, and each agent needs the same amount of time
for the job to be processed. Furthermore, an agent’s waiting cost is assumed
to be constant per unit of time, but agents differ in their waiting costs. Each
agent’s utility is equal to the amount of his monetary transfer minus his
total waiting costs. We are interested in finding the order in which to serve
agents and the (positive or negative) monetary compensations they should
receive. Recently, this problem has been analyzed in various perspectives:
incentive issues (Dolan, 1978; Suijs, 1996; Mitra 2001, 2002), cooperative
game theoretic approach (Maniquet, 2003; Chun, 2006a; Chun and Hokari,
2004), no-envy (Chun, 2006b), merging and splitting (Moulin, 2004, 2006;
O¨zsoy 2005), and others.
In particular, Maniquet (2003) proposes the minimal transfer rule for a
model in which a facility serves one agent at a time. This rule corresponds
to the Shapley (1953) value of the game when the worth of each coalition
is defined to be the minimum waiting costs incurred by its members under
the optimistic assumption that they are served before the non-coalitional
members. On the other hand, Chun (2006a) proposes the maximal transfer
rule and shows that it corresponds to the Shapley value of the game when the
worth of each coalition is defined to be the minimum waiting costs incurred
by its members under the pessimistic assumption that they are served after
the non-coalitional members.
In this paper, we extend the model by assuming the facility has two
parallel servers. Also, we introduce two rules for the problem, the minimal
and the maximal transfer rule, and discuss their properties. As in Maniquet
(2003) and Chun (2006a), our rules correspond to the Shapley value of the
game in which the worth of each coalition is appropriately defined. However,
our results are not a simple adaptation of previous results since we need to
consider the transfer between two agents served at the same time. According
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to our rules, even though two agents are served at the same time, their
transfers are different: the transfer can be interpreted as if an agent with a
smaller unit waiting cost receives a monetary transfer from the other agent
in the same group with a larger unit waiting cost. If an agent preceding
the group leaves, then the agent with a larger unit waiting cost moves to
the preceding group, thus saving a unit waiting cost. Such a contingent
possibility requires that the monetary transfer should be imposed agents in
the same group as well as those in the different groups.
We begin our study in the hope to give a sufficient insight to deal with the
queueing problem with an arbitrary number of servers. However, we could
not achieve our goal yet. We can provide an answer to problems with two
parallel servers, but it cannot be generalized to problems with more than two
servers due to computational difficulties.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents preliminaries. Sec-
tion 3 discusses how the cooperative game theory can be applied to solve our
queueing problems and investigates implications of the optimistic approach.
Section 4 investigates implications of the pessimistic approach in the queue-
ing problems with two servers. In section 5, we conclude by discussing other
possible extensions of the problem.
2. Preliminaries
Let I ≡ {1, 2, · · · } be an (infinite) universe of “potential” agents, and N be
the family of non-empty finite subsets of I. Each agent i ∈ I is characterized
by his unit waiting cost, θi ≥ 0. We assume that the facility can handle
two agents at a time and each agent needs the same amount of service time,
normalized as unit time. Given N ∈ N , each agent i ∈ N is assigned a group
gi ∈ N which is his service order in the queue, and a positive or negative
transfer ti ∈ R. The group which is served first incurs no waiting cost. If
agent i ∈ N is served in the gith group, his waiting cost is (gi − 1)θi. Each
agent i ∈ N has a quasi-linear utility function: his utility from the bundle
(gi, ti) is given by u(gi, ti; θi) = ti − (gi − 1)θi.
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A queueing problem with two parallel servers or a two-server queueing
problem is defined as a list q = (N, θ; 2) where N ∈ N is the set of agents,
θ ∈ RN+ is the vector of unit waiting costs, and 2 is the number of servers.
Since we analyze two-server problems, 2 indicating the number of servers
is omitted for simplicity. Let QN be the class of all two-server queueing
problems for N and Q = ∪QN . An allocation for q ∈ Q is a pair z = (g, t),
where for each i ∈ N , gi the group to which agent i belongs, and ti the
monetary transfer to him. An allocation is feasible if less than or equal to
two agents are assigned to each group and the sum of transfers is not positive.
Thus, the set of feasible allocations Z(q) consists of all pairs z = (g, t) such
that for any distinct agents i, j, k ∈ N , gi = gj implies gk 6= gi and
∑
i∈N ti ≤
0.
Given q = (N, θ) ∈ QN , an allocation z = (g, t) ∈ Z(q) is group efficient
if it minimizes the total waiting costs, that is, for each z′ = (g′, t′) ∈ Z(q),∑
i∈N(gi − 1)θi ≤
∑
i∈N(g
′
i − 1)θi. The efficient group of a problem does not
depend on the transfers. Moreover, it is unique except for agents with equal
unit waiting costs. The set of efficient groups for q ∈ QN is denoted by
Eff (q). For a group to be efficient, two agents with the largest unit waiting
costs should be in the first group, and the two agents with the next two
largest unit waiting cost should be in the second group, and so on.
Given q = (N, θ) ∈ QN , an allocation z = (g, t) ∈ Z(q) is budget balanced
if
∑
i∈N ti = 0. An allocation rule, or simply a rule, is a mapping ϕ : Q →∑
N∈N Z(q), which associates with every N ∈ N and every q ∈ QN a non-
empty subset ϕ(q) of feasible allocations. The pair ϕi(q) = (gi, ti) represents
the service time of agent i and his transfer in q under ϕ.
To facilitate our analysis, we rename agents by index d according to their
unit waiting costs. We assign an agent with the largest unit waiting cost 1,
the second largest 2, and so on. The index is unique except for agents with
equal waiting costs. These agents have to be indexed consecutively but in
any order. Given q = (N, θ) ∈ QN , let D(q) be the set of all possible indices.
If we line up agents according to the index, and assign the first two agents to
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the first group, the next two agents to the second group, and so on, we have
an efficient group. That is, for each d ∈ D(q) and each i ∈ N, gi is defined
as
gi = ddi2 e =
{
di
2
if di is even,
di+1
2
if di is odd.
Then, the resulting group is efficient. Given q = (N, θ) ∈ QN , d ∈ D(q), and
i ∈ N , let Pi(d) be the set of agents with smaller indices than agent i and
Fi(d) the set of agents with larger indices than agent i.
Now we define the minimal transfer rule. This rule chooses an efficient
group. Then, the transfer to agent i is assigned as if it consists of two
parts, compensation to agent i and payment of agent i: compensation to
agent i is the sum of all the group numbers assigned to all agents in the
preceding groups divided by i’s index. After determining compensations
to each agent, the compensation is assigned equally to agents with smaller
indices as payment. Thus, the payment of agent i is the sum of all those
assigned to agent i from all other agents with larger indices.
Minimal transfer rule: for each N ∈ N , each q ∈ QN , and each d ∈ D(q),
ϕM(q) = {(gM , tM) ∈ Z(q) | gM ∈ Eff (q), and ∀i ∈ N,
tMi =
∑
gM
j
<gM
i
gMj ·2
di
· θi −
∑
k∈Fi(d)
{ 1
dk−1 ·
∑
gM
j
<gM
k
gMj ·2
dk
· θk}.
Remark 1: Alternatively, the transfer can be expressed as follows. For each
i ∈ N,
tMi =
gMi (g
M
i − 1)
di
θi −
∑
j∈Fi(d)
1
dj − 1
gMj (g
M
j − 1)
dj
θj.
Since this expression is somewhat easier to manipulate, we will use it in the
proofs.
Remark 2: We show that our minimal transfer rule coincides with the rule
discussed in Maniquet (2003) for one-server problems, in which a facility can
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handle one agent at a time. Since only one agent is served in one-server
problems at a time, group gi can be replaced by index di which represents
i’s position in the queue, and 2 in the numerator of the compensation should
be changed to 1. Altogether, the definition becomes
tMi (q1) =
∑
dj<di
dj ·1
di
· θi −
∑
k∈N :dk>di
( 1
dk−1 ·
∑
dj<dk
dj ·1
dk
· θk)
= di−1
2
θi −
∑
k∈N :dk>di
1
2
θk,
as desired. Moreover, as discussed in Section 3, our rule can be characterized
by axioms in the same spirit as Maniquet’s (2003).
Next we present an example to show how the minimal transfer rule is
calculated.
Example 1: Minimal transfer rule. Let N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and θ ≡
(θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5, θ6) be such that θ1 > θ2 > θ3 > θ4 > θ5 > θ6. By effi-
ciency, gM = (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3) and d = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). The transfer assigned
by the minimal transfer rule is
tM1 = − 12 23θ3 − 13 12θ4 − 14 65θ5 − 15θ6
tM2 = − 12 23θ3 − 13 12θ4 − 14 65θ5 − 15θ6
tM3 =
1·2
3
θ3 − 13 12θ4 − 14 65θ5 − 15θ6
tM4 =
1·2
4
θ4 − 14 65θ5 − 15θ6
tM5 =
1·2+2·2
5
θ5 − 15θ6
tM6 =
1·2+2·2
6
θ6.
Since agents 3 and 4 belong to the same group, they are served at the same
time. However, the minimal transfer rule assigns different amount of transfers
to them. In fact, agent 3’s transfer has the term −(1/6)θ4, which can be
regarded as payment of 3 to 4. If either agent 1 or agent 2 leaves the queue
without being served, then one agent in the second group moves up to the
first group. By efficiency of the minimal transfer rule, an agent with a larger
unit waiting cost, agent 3, moves up. Since agent 3 can save his waiting cost
in the process, agent 3 compensates to agent 4 even though they are served
at the same time now. 
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3. An optimistic approach to queueing games
The two-server queueing problem can solved by applying cooperative game
theoretic solution as in Maniquet (2003) and Chun (2006a). First, we for-
mally describe TU (transferable utility) games. Let the set of players N ∈ N
be given. A set S ⊆ N is a coalition. A TU game, or a game, is a real-valued
function v defined on all coalitions S ⊆ N satisfying v(∅) = 0. The number
v(S) represents the worth of a coalition S. Let ΓN be the class of games
with player set N , and Γ = ∪ΓN . A value is a function φ defined on Γ which
associates with every N ∈ N and every v ∈ ΓN a vector φ(v) = (φi(v))i∈N .
The number φi(v) is the payoff to player i in game v.
We introduce the best-known value for games, the Shapley (1953) value:
it assigns each player a payoff equal to a weighted average of his marginal
contributions to all possible coalitions, with weights being determined by the
size of coalitions.
Shapley value, SV: For each q = (N, θ) ∈ QN and each i ∈ N ,
SVi(v) =
∑
S:i∈S
(|S| − 1)!(|N\S|)!
|N |! {v(S)− v(S\{i})}.
As in Maniquet (2003), we define the worth of each coalition S ⊆ N to
be the minimum waiting cost incurred by its members assuming that they
are served before the non-coalitional members. That is, for each S ⊆ N, its
worth vM(S) is defined by setting
vM(S) = −
∑
i∈S
(gSi − 1)θi,
where gS ∈Eff (qS) and qS = (S, {θ}i∈S).
Next is an example showing that the Shapely value applied to the queue-
ing game results in the same payoff as our minimal transfer rule.
Example 2: (Example 1 continued.) Let N and θ be defined as in Example
1. The Shapley value assigns each agent the following payoff: SV (vM) =
7
(−1
3
θ3 − 16θ4 − 310θ5 − 15θ6,−13θ3 − 16θ4 − 310θ5 − 15θ6,−13θ3 − 16θ4 − 310θ5 −
1
5
θ6,−12θ4 − 310θ5 − 15θ6,−45θ5 − 15θ6,−θ6).
Since ti = (gi− 1)θi+ ui, the corresponding transfer is t = (−13θ3− 16θ4−
3
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θ5 − 15θ6,−13θ3 − 16θ4 − 310θ5 − 15θ6, 23θ3 − 16θ4 − 310θ5 − 15θ6, 12θ4 − 310θ5 −
1
5
θ6,
6
5
θ5− 15θ6, θ6), which coincides with the transfer assigned by the minimal
transfer rule in Example 1. 
Before we discuss the relation between the minimal transfer rule and the
Shapley value, we show how the dividend can be calculated for two-server
queueing games. It is well-known that a TU-game v can be written as a
linear combination of unanimity games, that is, v =
∑
T⊆N λv(T )uT , where
the unanimity game uT on N is given by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT = 0
otherwise. For each S ⊆ N, its dividend λv(S) is defined by if |S| = 1, then
λv(S) = v(S), and if |S| > 1, λv(S) = v(S)−
∑
T S λv(T ).
Lemma 1. For each q = (N, θ) ∈ QN , the unanimity coefficient of S ⊆ N
is defined as
λvM (S) =
{
0 if |S| =1 or 2,
−(−2)|S|−3min
k∈S
θk if |S| ≥3.
Proof. If |S| = 1 or 2, the conclusion is obtained trivially from vM(S) =
0. If |S| = 3, λvM (S) = vM(S) −
∑
T S λvM (T ) = v
M(S) = −min
i∈S
θi =
−(−2)3−3min
i∈S
θi, as desired. Now, as induction hypothesis, suppose that the
conclusion holds for all S ⊂ N such that |S| ≤ s− 1. We need to show that
the conclusion is true for |S| = s. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that S ≡ {1, 2, . . . , s}, θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θs, and that for each i ∈ S, di = i.
Thus, for each i ∈ S, if i is odd, gi = (i+ 1)/2, and if i is even, gi = i/2. We
will use the binomial theorem, (a + b)n =
∑n
i=0
(
n
i
)
aibn−i after replacing a
with −2 and b with 1. First, we rewrite λvM (S):
λvM (S) = v
M(S)−∑T(S λvM (T )
= vM(S) +
∑
T(S,|T |≥3(−2)|T |−3mini∈T θi
= vM(S) +
∑s−1
i=3 (
∑i
j=3
(
i−1
j−1
)
(−2)j−3)θi +
∑s−1
j=3
(
s−1
j−1
)
(−2)j−3θs
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By the binomial theorem and the definition of gi, the second term is rewritten
as: ∑s−1
i=3 (
∑i
j=3
(
i−1
j−1
)
(−2)j−3)θi
=
∑s−1
i=3 (
∑i−1
j=2
(
i−1
j
)
(−2)j−2)θi
=
∑s−1
i=3
1
4
(
∑i−1
j=2
(
i−1
j
)
(−2)j(1)i−1−j)θi
=
∑s−1
i=3
1
4
[(
∑i−1
j=0
(
i−1
j
)
(−2)j(1)i−1−j)− 1 + 2(i− 1)]θi
=
∑s−1
i=3
1
4
[(−2 + 1)i−1 − 1 + 2(i− 1)]θi
=
∑s−1
i=3
(−1)i−1−1+2(i−1)
4
θi
=
∑s−1
i=3 (gi − 1)θi. (1)
Similarly, the third term is rewritten as:∑s−1
j=3
(
s−1
j−1
)
(−2)j−3θs
=
∑s−2
j=2
(
s−1
j
)
(−2)j−2θs
=
∑s−1
j=2
(
s−1
j
)
(−2)j−2θs − (−2)s−3θs
= 1
4
∑s−1
j=2
(
s−1
j
)
(−2)jθs − (−2)s−3θs
= 1
4
[
∑s−1
j=0
(
s−1
j
)
(−2)j − 1 + 2(s− 1)]θs − (−2)s−3θs
= 1
4
[(−2 + 1)s−1 − 1 + 2(s− 1)]θs − (−2)s−3θs
= (−1)
s−1−1+2(s−1)
4
θs − (−2)s−3θs
= (gs − 1)θs − (−2)s−3θs.
Since vM(S) = −∑si=3(gi−1)θi, λvM (S) = −(−2)s−3θs = −(−2)s−3mini∈S θi,
the desired conclusion.
Now we prove that the minimal transfer rule assigns the same payoff as
the Shapley value applied to the queueing game when the worth of a coalition
is optimistically defined.
Theorem 1. Let q ∈ QN and d ∈ D(q). Let z = (g, t) ∈ Z(q) be such that
agents’ utilities at z are equal to the payoff vector obtained by applying the
Shapley value to vM . Then, g ∈Eff (q) and for each i ∈ N , ti = tMi .
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Proof. Let N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θn and that for each i ∈ N, di = i. By Lemma 1, for
each i ∈ N, the allocation assigned by the Shapley value can be calculated
as follows:
SVi(v
M) =
∑
i∈S,S⊆N
λ
vM
(S)
|S|
=
∑i
k=3
−(−2)k−3
k
(
i−1
k−1
)
θi +
∑n
j=i+1
∑j
k=3
−(−2)k−3
k
(
j−2
k−2
)
θj.
By the binomial theorem and the definition of gi, the first term in SVi(v
M)
can be rewritten as: for each i ∈ N,
∑i
k=3
−(−2)k−3
k
(
i−1
k−1
)
θi
=
∑i
k=3
−(−2)k−3
k
(i−1)!
(i−k)!(k−1)!θi
=
∑i
k=3−(−2)k−3 i!(i−k)!k! 1i θi
=
∑i
k=3
−(−2)k−3
i
(
i
k
)
θi
= 1
8i
∑i
k=3(−2)k
(
i
k
)
θi
= 1
8i
[
∑i
k=0(−2)k
(
i
k
)− (1− 2i+ 4 (i−1)i
2
)]θi
= 1
8i
[(−1)i − (1− 2i+ 4 (i−1)i
2
)]θi
= 1
8i
((−1)i − 1 + 2i− 2i(i− 1))θi
= [−(gi − 1) + gi(gi−1)i ]θi. (2)
Similarly, by (1) and (2), the second term in SVi(v
M) can be rewritten as:
∑n
j=i+1
∑j
k=3
−(−2)k−3
k
(
j−2
k−2
)
θj
=
∑n
j=i+1
∑j
k=3
−(−2)k−3
k
k−1
j−1
(
j−1
k−1
)
θj
= −∑nj=i+1 1j−1∑jk=3(−2)k−3 k−1k (j−1k−1)θj
= −∑nj=i+1 1j−1 [∑jk=3(−2)k−3(j−1k−1)−∑jk=3 (−2)k−3k (j−1k−1))]θj
= −∑nj=i+1 1j−1 [(gj − 1)− (gj − 1) + (gj−j)(gj−1)j ]θj
= −∑nj=i+1 1j−1 gj(gj−1)j θj.
Altogether, for each i ∈ N,
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SVi(v
M) =
∑i
k=3
−(−2)k−3
k
(
i−1
k−1
)
θi +
∑n
j=i+1
∑j
k=3
−(−2)k−3
k
(
j−2
k−2
)
θj
= [−(gi − 1) + gi(gi−1)i ]θi −
∑n
j=i+1
1
j−1
gj(gj−1)
j
θj,
which is the desired expression as noted in Remark 1.
Remark 3: The minimal transfer rule can be characterized by axioms used
in Maniquet (2003), but appropriately modified to be suitable for two-server
queueing problems. In fact, (1) it is the only rule satisfying efficiency, Pareto
indifference, equal treatment of equals, and independence of larger costs; (2) it
is the only rule satisfying Pareto indifference, the identical preferences lower
bound, negative cost monotonicity, and least-cost agent equal responsibility;
(3) it minimizes the sum of the absolute values of transfers among agents
among the rules satisfying Pareto indifference, the identical preferences lower
bound, and least-cost agent equal responsibility.1
4. A pessimistic approach and the maximal
transfer rule
Now we investigate a pessimistic definition for a worth of a coalition which
assumes the members in a coalition are served after the non-coalitional mem-
bers. As in Chun (2006a), even though we apply the same Shapley value to
the game, the resulting rule is different.
1Efficiency requires that the rule should choose allocations that are group efficient and
budget balanced. Pareto indifference requires that if an allocation is chosen by a rule,
then all other allocations which assign the same utilities to each agent should be chosen
by the rule. Equal treatment of equals requires that those who have the same unit waiting
cost should end up with the same utilities. Independence of larger costs requires that an
increase in an agent’s unit waiting cost should not affect agents with smaller unit waiting
costs. The identical cost lower bound (Moulin, 1990) requires that each agent should be at
least as well off as he would be, under efficiency and equal treatment of equals, if all agents
had the same unit waiting cost. Negative cost monotonicity requires that an increase in an
agent’s unit waiting cost should cause all other agents to weakly lose. Finally, least-cost
agent equal responsibility requires that upon the departure of the agent served last, the rule
should choose a group efficient allocation which divides the last agent’s transfer equally
among all remaining agents.
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First, we introduce an alternative definition for a worth of a coalition
S ⊆ N from the pessimistic viewpoint. To do this, we need to consider the
cardinality of N\S because it is served before the coalition S. If |N\S| is
even, then agents in S will be served from ( |N |−|S|
2
+ 1)th group. If |N\S|
is odd, the last group of N\S is composed of one agent from N\S and one
agent from S. Therefore, the waiting cost of i ∈ S, Ci(S), can be calculated
as follows. For each i ∈ S,
Ci(S) =

( |N |−|S|
2
+ (gSi − 1))θi if |N | − |S| is even,
( |N |−|S|−1
2
+ (gSi − 1))θi if |N | − |S| is odd and dSi is odd,
( |N |−|S|−1
2
+ gSi )θi if |N | − |S| is odd and dSi is even.
where gS ∈Eff (qS) and qS = (S, {θ}i∈S). Also, the worth of a coalition S
from the pessimistic viewpoint, vX(S), is defines as
vX(S) = −
∑
i∈S
Ci(S).
Next we introduce the maximal transfer rule. This rule chooses an effi-
cient group. Once again, the transfer to agent i is assigned as if it consists
of two parts, compensation to agent i and payment of agent i. Assuming
an even number of agents, payment of agent i is the sum of all the group
numbers assigned to following groups minus i’s group number times 2 (which
is the number of agents in the group) divided by the followers including him.
After determining payments to each agent, the amount is assigned equally
to agents with larger indices than agent i as compensation. Thus, the com-
pensation to agent i is the sum of all those assigned to agent i from all other
agents with smaller indices.
We note that there is a symmetry between the minimal and the maximal
transfer rules. The preceding groups are considered in calculating the “com-
pensation” for the minimal transfer rule, and then the preceding agents pay
the compensation equally. On the other hand, following groups are consid-
ered in calculating the “payment” for the maximal transfer rule, and then
the following agents share the payment equally.
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For each N ∈ N , each q ∈ QN , each d ∈ D(q), and each i ∈ N, let pi be
the payment of agent i, defined as
pi =

∑
gj>gi
(gj−gi)·2
n−di+1 θi if n is even,∑
gj>gi,gj<dn2 e
(gj−gi)·2
n−di+1 θi +
dn
2
e−gi
n−di+1θi if n is odd.
Maximal transfer rule: for each N ∈ N , each q ∈ QN , and each d ∈ D(q),
ϕX(q) = {(gX , tX) ∈ Z(q) | gX ∈ Eff (q), and ∀i ∈ N,
tXi =
∑
j∈Pi(d)
pj
n−dj − pi}.
Next example shows how the transfer for the maximal transfer rule is
calculated.
Example 3: The Shapley value in a pessimistic approach.
Let N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and θ ≡ (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5, θ6) be such that θ1 >
θ2 > θ3 > θ4 > θ5 > θ6. Now we apply the Shapley value in a pessimistic
perspective and calculate the corresponding transfer.

tX1 = − 1·2+2·26 θ1
tX2 =
1
5
θ1 − 1·2+2·25 θ2
tX3 =
1
5
θ1 +
1
4
6
5
θ2 − 1·24 θ3
tX4 =
1
5
θ1 +
1
4
6
5
θ2 +
1
3
1
2
θ3 − 1·23 θ4
tX5 =
1
5
θ1 +
1
4
6
5
θ2 +
1
3
1
2
θ3 +
1
2
2
3
θ4
tX6 =
1
5
θ1 +
1
4
6
5
θ2 +
1
3
1
2
θ3 +
1
2
2
3
θ4.
Therefore, it coincides with transfers specified by the maximal transfer rule.
We note that p1 =
{(2−1)+(3−1)}·2
6−1+1 θ1 = θ1, and it is equally shared by the
followers, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, by 1
5
θ1. Similarly, p2 =
{(2−1)+(3−1)}·2
6−2+1 θ2 =
6
5
θ2 and
it is equally shared by the followers 3, 4, 5, and 6 by 1
4
6
5
θ2. And so on. 
As in the optimistic approach, we relate the maximal transfer rule with
the Shapley value. First, we derive the unanimity coefficient λvX .
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Lemma 2. For each q = (N, θ) ∈ QN , the unanimity coefficient of S ⊆ N
is defined as follows. If |N | is even, then
λvX (S) =

−(dn
2
e − 1)θi if |S| = 1 and i ∈ S,
0 if |S| = 2,
(−2)|S|−3max
k∈S
θk if |S| ≥ 3,
and if |N | is odd, then
λvX (S) =

−(dn
2
e − 1)θi if |S| = 1 and i ∈ S,
max
k∈S
θk if |S| = 2,
−(−2)|S|−3max
k∈S
θk if |S| ≥ 3.
Proof. Let N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n}. We will prove only when |N | is even. For
each i ∈ N, if S = {i}, then λvX (S) = vX(S) = −(dn2 e − 1)θi. For each i,
j ∈ N such that i 6= j, if S = {i, j}, then λvX (S) = vX(S)−
∑
T(S λvX (T ) =
−(dn
2
e− 1)(θi+ θj) + (dn2 e− 1)θi+ (dn2 e− 1)θj = 0. For each i, j, k ∈ N such
that k > max{i, j}, if S = {i, j, k}, then λvX (S) = vX(S)−
∑
T(S λvX (T ) =
−(dn
2
e − 1)(θi + θj)− (dn2 e − 2)θk + (dn2 e − 1)(θi + θj + θk) = θk, as desired.
Now, as induction hypothesis, suppose that the conclusion holds for each
S ⊂ N such that |S| ≤ s − 1. We need to show that the conclusion is true
for |S| = s. Without loss of generality, we assume that S ≡ {1, 2, . . . , s} and
that θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ · · · ≤ θs. First, we consider the case when |S| is even.
λvX (S) = v
X(S)−∑T(S λvX (T )
= −(dn
2
e − 1)(θ1 + θ2)− (dn2 e − 2)(θ3 + θ4)− · · · − (dn2 e − s2)(θs−1 + θs)
−∑s−1i=3 (∑ij=3(−2)j−3(i−1j−1))θi −∑s−1i=3 (−2)i−3(i−1j−1)θs
+(dn
2
e − 1)(θ1 + θ2 + · · ·+ θs)
= [( s
2
− 1)(θs + θs−1) + ( s2 − 2)(θs−2 + θs−3) + · · ·+ (θ4 + θ3)]
−[∑s−1i=3 (∑ij=3(−2)j−3(i−1j−1))θi]− [∑s−1i=3 (−2)i−3(i−1j−1)θs].
By the binomial theorem, the terms above can be rewritten as
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∑s−1
i=3 (
∑i
j=3(−2)j−3
(
i−1
j−1
)
)θi =
∑s−1
i=3
2i−3+(−1)i−1
4
θi
= ( s
2
− 1)θs−1 + ( s2 − 2)(θs−2 + θs−3) + · · ·+ (θ4 + θ3)∑s−1
i=3 (−2)i−3
(
s−1
j−1
)
θs = [
2s−3+(−1)s−1
4
− (−2)s−3]θs
= [( s
2
− 1)− (−2)s−3]θs.
Altogether, λvX (S) = (−2)s−3θs = (−2)s−3maxi∈S θi, the desired conclusion.
The case when |S| is odd can be proven in a similar way.
Now we show that the maximal transfer rule assigns the same payoff as
the Shapley value applied to the queueing game when the worth of a coalition
is pessimistically defined.
Theorem 2. Let q ∈ QN and d ∈ D(q). Let z = (g, t) ∈ Z(q) be such that
agents’ utilities at z are equal to the payoff vector obtained by applying the
Shapley value to vX . Then, g ∈Eff (q) and for each i ∈ N , ti = tXi .
Proof. Let N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n}.Without loss of generality, we may assume that
θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θn and that for each i ∈ N, di = i. First, we consider the
case when |N | is even. By Lemma 2, for each i ∈ N, the transfer assigned
by the Shapley value can be expressed as:
ti = −(dn
2
e − 1)θi +
∑
i∈S,S⊆N
(−2)s−3maxk∈S θk
s
+ (gi − 1)θi
where |S| = s. For each i ∈ N, ti can be rewritten as
ti = [(gi − dn2 e) +
∑n−i+1
s=3
(−2)s−3
s
(
n−i
s−1
)
]θi +
∑i−1
j=1[
∑n−j+1
s=3
(−2)s−3
s
(
n−j−1
s−2
)
]θj
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By the binomial theorem, the terms in the first half are rewritten as
(gi − dn2 e) +
∑n−i+1
s=3
(−2)s−3
s
(
n−i
s−1
)
= (gi − dn2 e) +
∑n−i+1
s=3 (−2)s−3 (n−i+1)!(n−i−s+1)!s! 1n−i+1
= (gi − dn2 e)− 18(n−i+1){
∑n−i+1
s=3 (−2)s
(
n−i+1
s
)}
= (gi − dn2 e)− 18(n−i+1) [
∑n−i+1
s=0 (−2)s
(
n−i+1
s
)− 1 + 2(n− i+ 1)− 2(n− i+ 1)(n− i)]
= (gi − dn2 e) + 2(n−i+1)(n−i−1)+1−(−1)
n−i+1
8(n−i+1)
=
{
− (n−i+2)(n−i)
4(n−i+1) , if i is even,
−n−i−1
4
, if i is odd,
}
= −
∑dn2 e
k=gi+1
(k−gi)·2
n−i+1 . (3)
Also, by the binomial theorem and (3), the terms in the second half can be
rewritten as∑n−j+1
s=3
(−2)s−3
s
(
n−j−1
s−2
)
= 1
n−j [(n− j)
∑n−j+1
s=3
(−2)s−3
s
(
n−j−1
s−2
)
]
= 1
n−j [
∑n−j+1
s=3 (−2)s−3 s−1n−j−s+1
(
n−j
s
)
]
= 1
n−j [
∑n−j+1
s=3 (−2)s−3 s−1n−j−s+1
(
n−j
s
)
+
∑n−j+1
s=3
(−2)s−3
s
(
n−j
s−1
)−∑n−j+1s=3 (−2)s−3s (n−js−1)]
= 1
n−j [
∑n−j+1
s=3 (−2)s−3{ s−1n−j−s+1
(
n−j
s
)
+ 1
s
(
n−j
s−1
)} −∑n−j+1s=3 (−2)s−3s (n−js−1)]
= 1
n−j [
∑n−j+1
s=3 (−2)s−3
(
n−j
s−1
)−∑n−j+1s=3 (−2)s−3s (n−js−1)]
= 1
n−j [
1
4
{(−1)n−j − 1 + 2(n− j)} −∑n−j+1s=3 (−2)s−3s (n−js−1)]
= 1
n−j [gn − gj −
∑n−j+1
s=3
(−2)s−3
s
(
n−j
s−1
)
]
= 1
n−j
∑dn2 e
k=gj+1
(k−gj)·2
n−j+1 .
Altogether, for each i ∈ N,
ti = −
∑dn
2
e
k=gi+1
(k − gi) · 2
n− i+ 1 θi +
∑
j∈Pi(d)
1
n− j
∑dn
2
e
k=gj+1
(k − gj) · 2
n− j + 1 θj
which coincides the transfer for the maximal transfer rule.
The case when |N | is odd can be proved in a similar way.
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Remark 4: As in Remark 1, the maxiaml rule can be characterized by
axioms in Chun (2006a), but modified to be suitable for two server queueing
problems.
5. Concluding remarks
In this section, we investigate other properties of the minimal transfer rule in
the current context and discuss a possible generalization of queueing prob-
lems with two servers.
5.1 Core, Nucleolus, and Shapley value
As in the one server case, it can easily be shown that our queueing game
vM is concave. Also, it can be checked that the allocations assigned by the
minimal and the maximal transfer rules belong to the anti-core of the game.
Chun and Hokari (2004) show that the prenucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969)
and the Shapley value coincides on the class of queueing problems with one
server. Similarly, we can ask whether these two solutions coincide for our
problems. As it turns out, they coincide on the class of problems with less
than or equal to 4 agents, but not any more for problems with more than 4
agents. Moreover, our games with four agents do not satisfy sufficient con-
ditions of Kar, Mitra, and Mutuswami (2005) for coincidence of the Shapley
value and the nucleolus. It would be interesting to investigate the existence
of another sufficient condition satisfied by our games with four agents.
5.2 Queueing problems with multiple servers
Our analysis on the queueing problem with two parallel servers can be gen-
eralized to the problem with an arbitrary number of servers. We conjecture
that an agent i’s utility for `-server problem is
u(gi, ti; θi) = −(gi−1)θi+
∑
gMj <g
M
i
gMj · `
di
·θi−
∑
k∈Fi(d)
{ 1
dk − 1 ·
∑
gMj <g
M
k
gMj · `
dk
·θk}
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where gi = ddi` e for each q` = (N, θ; `) and d ∈ D(q`). However, we could not
prove our conjecture due to computational difficulties.
5.3 Other issues
This paper leaves many interesting open questions. First, it would be in-
teresting to generalize the problem by assuming that agents need different
amounts of processing time. Also, it would be interesting to study an in-
centive compatible mechanism for the problem as Suijs (1996) for problems
with one server. We hope to address these issues in our future research.
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